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Abstract 
The nature of cross-border police cooperation in Southern Africa has undergone radical 
transformation over the past two decades. Numerous international treaties and agreements 
now formalize and enhance the conduct and effectiveness of police cooperation. Legislative 
and policy initiatives have given shape and form to a framework of cooperation, with the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its constituent Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) at its centre. The 
establishment of Afripol in 2015 suggests that transnational policing is becoming more 
centralized, similar in ways to the EU transnational policing infrastructure. The chapter 




The creation of the African Police Cooperation Organisation (Afripol) in 2015 represented a 
new departure for police cooperation in Africa. African governments which were renowned 
for their ‘regionalism’ appeared to have embraced the ideal of ‘centralization’ which was 
more common to the neighbouring continent of Europe. Although the founding Statute of 
Afripol (2017) said nothing of the EU or its primary centralized agency for police 
cooperation, Europol, it is widely expected that European experiences will have a significant 
influence on the evolution of its structures, processes and practices (Dietrich, 2016; Vorrath 
and Zoppei, 2017). Due to the relentless introduction of centralized agencies and legal and 
procedural instruments within the EU area since the early 1990s, the EU policing project is 
widely considered to be the prime case of regional police cooperation from which 
generalizations can be drawn (Anderson et al., 1995; Walsh, 1998; Occhipinti, 2003; Den 
Boer, 2010; Dietrich 2016). Moreover, the Chief Commissioner of the Seychelles Police 
explicitly announced that ‘Afripol … will be similar to other continental bodies like Europe’s 
Europol for example’ (Uranie and Nicette, 2014), while one Rwandan newspaper anticipated 
that ‘Afripol will act on the model of Europol’ (Tumwebaze, 2013). 
 
This chapter will consider whether and to what extent the creation of Afripol represents a 
shift towards a more centralized ‘European’ model of transnational policing.  Since Afripol 
remains an embryonic organization for police cooperation and has not, at the time of writing, 
published its first annual report, the chapter will consider the recent evolution of regional 
structures and processes for police cooperation and evaluate whether there is an identifiable 
trend towards centralization. Due in part to the size of Afripol’s membership base (40 
participant states), and the fact that one of the authors is based at the University of Cape 
Town, South Africa, the evaluation will be concerned primarily with the conduct and 
evolution of transnational policing in Southern Africa, as a distinct region. Unfortunately, 
much of the research on transnational policing in Southern Africa is thin on the ground, so 
the chapter must rely on research which is almost a decade old in parts (see Hills, 2008; van 
der Spuy, 2009; Tait and van der Spuy, 2010). 
 
The evolution of Afripol 
The chiefs of police of 40 African countries, ranging from Algeria to Zimbabwe, adopted a 
recommendation to establish the African Police Cooperation Organisation (Afripol) at the 
22
nd
 African Regional Conference of Interpol held in Oran, Algeria on 10-12 September 2013 
(Recommendation No. 7). The recommendation was driven by deepening concerns about the 
challenges of combatting increasingly complex forms of terrorism and organized crime in 
several African sub-regions. Recognizing the need for greater police cooperation at strategic, 
tactical and operational levels, Afripol is designed to facilitate the coordinated assessment of 
threats, analysis of criminal intelligence, the harmonization of police methods, the exchange 
of best practices and investigative techniques, and the planning and implementation of 
actions, and the strengthening of African police capabilities. Although the recommendation 
was adopted at an Interpol Regional Conference, the recommendation provided that Afripol 
would subsequently derive its legal and juridical personality from the African Union (AU).  
 
Following four years of negotiation between regional police forums and government 
representatives from the participating states, the founding Statute of Afripol, the African 
Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation, was ratified in 2017 at the 28
th
 Summit of the 
African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It required the new organization to: establish a 
framework for police cooperation at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between the 
Participant State police institutions; facilitate the prevention, detection and investigation of 
transnational organized crime in coordination and collaboration with national, regional and 
international police institutions; prepare a harmonized African strategy to fight against 
transnational organized crime, terrorism and cyber-crime; and enhance coordination among 
police forces (Art. 3). More specifically, in order to achieve these objectives, it should assist 
Member States’ police institutions to set up a framework of cooperation at the national, 
regional, and international levels; assist Member States’ police institutions to improve their 
efficiency and effectiveness; facilitate the sharing of information or intelligence to prevent 
and combat transnational organized crimes, terrorism and cybercrime; enable planning and 
coordination of joint patrols and operations; and develop appropriate communication 
strategies, systems and databases, amongst other requirements (Art. 4). With its headquarters 
in Algeria and funded by the budget of the AU, Afripol’s organizational structure is headed 
by a Director, who is supported by a Secretariat, National Liaison Offices, regular ‘session’ 
meetings of a General Assembly of the chiefs of police, a President of the General Assembly 
and a broader ‘Steering Committee’ of AU officials (Arts. 7 - 13). 
 
However, it is still too early to determine the extent to which Afripol will redefine the 
transnational policing landscape in Southern Africa. Afripol’s website (afripol.peaceau.org), 
within 12 months of its official launch, did not contain any data or entries under its 
‘documents’ tab, nor had it published any threat assessments or reports on its website. 
Moreover, its founding statute does not outline what the ‘framework of cooperation’ or the 
‘appropriate communication strategies, systems and databases’ should look like. The frequent 
use of the terms ‘assist’ and ‘facilitate’ in Article 4 suggests that it will have limited power, if 
any, to require cooperation to take place on the ground. Furthermore, questions have already 
been raised about the quality of Afripol’s leadership after the first President of the Afripol 
General Assembly, Director General of the Algerian Police, Abdelghani Hamel, was 
dismissed amid a drug-trafficking scandal in Algeria a little over a year after Afripol’s 
official launch (Rouaba, 2018). In the absence of any official Afripol annual reports or threat 
assessments to determine the level of impact that the organization has had in its first 12 
months of operation, the chapter will turn to developments in one distinct region within 
Africa, namely Southern Africa, to consider whether the establishment of Afripol represents a 
shift towards a centralized model of transnational policing. 
 
The evolution of the Southern African framework for transnational policing: a trend towards 
centralization 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992 to replace a 
number of inter-governmental networks and conferences responsible for facilitating 
cooperation in socio-economic, political and security policy areas. It has 16 Participant 
States, including: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, eSwatini and Zambia, amongst others, as of 
2018. One of the catalysts for its establishment was the publication of a document by one of 
its forerunners, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), 
entitled ‘SADCC: Towards Economic Integration’, which had argued that a higher level of 
cooperation would enable the countries of the region to address problems of national 
development, such as food security and poor infrastructure, and increase regional trade and 
cross border investment, especially at a time when the system of apartheid and the remaining 
remnants of colonialism and the Cold War were being dismantled across Southern Africa 
(SADC 1992). The proposals were subsequently adopted in a Declaration and Treaty at a 
summit of heads of state and government in Windhoek, Namibia in 1992, which tasked the 
organization with fostering greater socio-economic, political and security cooperation in the 
region (Art. 21 and 22 of the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community 1992). 
Reflecting an ethos of democratization, the new inter-governmental organization consisted of 
a regular summit of governmental leaders of the participating states, a council of ministers in 
each of its primary policy areas, a tribunal to resolve legal conflicts and a secretariat. 
 
However, initial attempts to establish mechanisms of police and security cooperation through 
the organization proved challenging. Countries and regions within Southern Africa continued 
to be affected by serious disorder and inter-state conflict throughout the 1990s (van der Spuy, 
2009). Political destabilization in the region had created weak political, social, economic and 
legal structures, and the public police in many countries were still viewed by civilians as 
agents and defenders of brutal, oppressive and corrupt regimes (Dissel, 2010). The civil strife 
and political tensions resulted in significant delays in the development of key institutions, 
such as the SADC’s tribunal, which was not formally inaugurated until 2005. It ultimately 
took almost ten years for the SADC to introduce substantive legal instruments regarding 
police cooperation. 
 
The slow-moving workings of the SADC encouraged many police chiefs in the region to 
pursue police cooperation independently. In 1995, three years after the SADC had been 
established to foster greater regional cooperation in the areas of peace and security, a meeting 
of police chiefs in Zimbabwe resulted in the creation of an entirely separate Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO). The organization functioned 
primarily as an independent forum for police chiefs and their representative subordinate 
officers to meet annually to discuss regional crime concerns, devise joint strategies to combat 
cross-border crime and share best practices (Tait and van der Spuy, 2010). Areas of interest 
initially included the theft and cross-border transfer of vehicles and livestock, trafficking in 
drugs, humans, firearms and precious stones, crimes against women and children, counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals, fraud, terrorism and wildlife crime. The participants prepared and 
disseminated information and intelligence on regional criminal activities; monitored joint 
crime management strategies; and formulated regional training policies, amongst other 
initiatives.  
 
In 1997, SARPCCO introduced an ‘Agreement in Respect of Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance in the Field of Crime Combating’ which represented a radical departure for cross-
border police cooperation in Southern Africa. In an area where national interests frequently 
trumped ‘regional’ ones (Hills, 2008), the Agreement established a framework for cross-
border police cooperation in Southern Africa which allowed police officers, with the 
permission of the host police force and acting under their authority, to travel across borders to 
undertake joint investigations and operations, question witnesses and seize exhibits in 
connection with any offence. The Agreement also provided for urgent ‘hot pursuit’ into 
foreign jurisdictions. In addition, the police chiefs established a mechanism for the exchange 
of information and intelligence, a desk for financial and economic crimes, and a Regional 
Organized crime Threat Analysis (ROCTA) (van der Spuy, 2009). The organization did not 
maintain a series of liaison bureaux or a hub of analysts to support these initiatives, but 
instead relied heavily upon Interpol’s Sub-Regional Bureau in Harare as a de facto secretariat 
(Dietrich, 2016). Interpol Sub-Regional Bureaux typically include the chief officers of all of 
the countries in that sub-region, who represent their respective police forces and National 
Central Bureaux (NCBs) (Hills, 2008). 
 
SARPCCO was not alone in utilizing Interpol; three other regional police chief forums and 
committees from across Africa also rely upon Interpol for administrative support (Dissel, 
2010). Although only loosely aligned, SARPCCO operates alongside the 
Central African Police Chiefs Committee, also known as Le Comité des Chefs de Police de 
l’Afrique Centrale (CCPAC), established in 1997; the Western African Police Chiefs 
Committee, also known as Le Comité des Chefs de Police de l’Afrique de l’Ouest 
(WAPCCO), and the Eastern African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (EAPCCO), 
established in 1998. Since Interpol tends to divide its scarce resources around the world, it 
can often do little other than provide an apolitical meeting place for senior police officers to 
come together to plan operations, facilitate communication between the participants, provide 
technical support, provide officers with laptops where needed and ask participating police 
forces to second an official to the scene of an investigation to ensure that the requisite 
procedures were followed, relying largely on its professional recognition (Hills, 2008; Lucey, 
2010). A post-operation report was then typically submitted to the Interpol secretariat and 
analysed by seconded specialist police officers focusing on specific priority crimes (Dietrich, 
2016). Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, SARPCCO had firmly established itself as the 
primary transnational policing organization in Southern Africa and had overseen a notable 
increase in the quality of cross-border police cooperation in the region (Tait and van der 
Spuy, 2010). Its successes had even stimulated the creation of similar regional organizations 
across Africa, such as CCPAC and EAPCCO. SARPCCO remains the most active, successful 
and high-profile regional police organization in Africa (Hills, 2008). 
 
SARPCCO was arguably so successful that its remit, which was largely the responsibility of 
the national police chiefs, was subsequently reflected (and largely duplicated) by the SADC 
within its ‘Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation’ introduced in 2001. 
Formulated by the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), which was 
established in 1996 to coordinate policies and activities concerning politics, defence and 
security at governmental level, the Protocol contained many of the same aims and objectives. 
Priorities were to include: promoting regional coordination and cooperation among the 
police, state security and other law enforcement agencies on matters related to safety, security 
and defence, amongst other areas. Specific areas of police cooperation were to include: drug 
trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, theft of livestock and vehicles, counter-
terrorism and extradition. Although SARPCCO was already facilitating cooperation in these 
areas, the establishment of the inter-governmental protocol represented a statement of intent 
by the participant governments that they would bear responsibility for the creation of a far 
more formal framework of cooperation. 
 
Further enhancing the extent of government involvement in matters of cross-border police 
cooperation, a Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials 
(2001) was also introduced. It provided for the establishment of national databases on 
firearms; inter-agency working groups to improve information-sharing and policy 
coordination; and the coordination of national training programmes and joint exercises. More 
particularly, Article 14 of the Protocol provided for mutual legal assistance in various areas, 
including measures concerning the investigation of offences, the gathering of evidence, 
requests for searches to be carried out, and any other form of assistance consistent with 
national laws. Article 15 of the Protocol provided for the establishment of police 
communication systems, national focal points and multidisciplinary law enforcement units. 
These instruments were followed by more wide-reaching measures in the areas of mutual 
legal assistance and extradition. Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Protocol on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters 2002 provided that the State Parties would provide each other 
with the ‘widest possible measure’ of mutual legal assistance in respect of investigations, 
prosecutions and proceedings in criminal matters. Such assistance could include locating and 
identifying persons, property, objects and items; search and seizure; taking evidence; 
obtaining statements; freezing proceeds of crime; providing and transferring exhibits; and the 
authorization of persons, including police officers, from the Requesting State to be present at 
the execution of requests (Art. 2.5). Upon receiving a request pursuant to the Protocol, the 
competent authorities of the Requested State were required to do everything in their power to 
promptly execute a request and follow the procedures or requirements requested therein 
(Arts. 4 & 5). Requests could be refused or postponed in instances where it was determined 
by the competent authority that the request could interfere with an ongoing criminal 
investigation or prosecution.  
 
In addition, the SADC Protocol on Extradition 2002 provided for the extradition of persons 
wanted for prosecution or for the enforcement of sentences of at least one-year’s 
imprisonment (Arts. 2 & 3). However, due in part to the history of apartheid and likelihood of 
inter-state conflict in Southern Africa, the protocol held that it was mandatory to refuse 
extradition for offences of a political nature or where there were substantial grounds for 
believing that the request was made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on 
account of that person’s race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, sex or political opinions 
(Art. 4a). Numerous other protocols were also established in the areas of illicit drug 
production and trafficking, the free movement of people, corruption and defence cooperation. 
 
The introduction of numerous legal instruments between 2001 and 2002 represented a major 
and radical shift in the treatment of cross-border police cooperation in Southern Africa, 
particularly at government level, within a remarkably short space of time. Although the 
SADC had struggled to introduce measures in the policing field in the decade prior, the 
relentless introduction of measures within a two-year timeframe marked a dramatic and 
unprecedented increase in governmental interest and inter-governmental cooperation. One of 
the most remarkable developments was the similarities between the SADC measures and 
ones which were introduced within the EU almost at the same time. Shortly before the 
introduction of the Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2002, the EU 
had introduced its Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000, which 
covered many of the same forms of assistance and cross-border cooperation. The EU also 
introduced its Framework Decision on the EAW in 2002, for the purposes of facilitating 
extradition according to common standards and processes (the EU instruments will be 
discussed in more depth below). The fact that the SADC introduced an unprecedented suite 
of measures almost at the same time as the neighbouring EU indicated that the SADC was 
ambitiously pursuing a similar agenda. The SADC and EU models appeared to be converging 
in the field of transnational policing. 
 
By the end of 2009, the SADC had subsumed SARPCCO. An amendment to the Protocol on 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation 2001 incorporated SARPCCO into the SADC. 
The measures introduced in 2001 and 2002 had apparently served to reassure police chiefs 
that the SADC could function as a cohesive policy-making body. Furthermore, the 
clarification of the SADC’s objectives in the areas of counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, vehicle and livestock theft, illegal 
immigration, disarmament and extradition, and the establishment in 2007 of a Regional 
Coordinating Committee (RCC) to drive the implementation of the SADC Protocol on 
Firearms of 2001 provided further proof of progress in cooperative ventures. 
 
The evolution of the Southern African framework for transnational policing: the reality on the 
ground 
Although the instruments introduced by the SADC created an unprecedented framework for 
police cooperation in Southern Africa, it did not necessarily mean that they directly affected 
and redefined the conduct of cross-border police cooperation on the ground. Although legal 
frameworks are an important source for police cooperation, they are not introduced and 
applied in a vacuum (Stenning, 1995; McDaniel, 2015). In Southern Africa, as in other 
regions of the world, context invariably shapes the implementation of normative and 
operational frameworks. It is widely acknowledged that both political and cultural factors can 
impede transnational forms of police cooperation (Anderson, 1989; Benyon et al., 1993). 
Nathan (2013), for example, questions whether Southern Africa can be described as an 
‘emerging’ or ‘embryonic’ security community at all. ‘Security communities’, he argues, 
exhibit a sense of ‘shared community’ and belonging based on trust. In Africa, however, 
States are typically weak in terms of institutional capacity, and governments often lack the 
popular legitimacy, infrastructural depth and political motivation to construct meaningful 
regional organizations (Hills, 2008). Where attempts are made to share ideas, values and 
political goals so that government policies can be used to transform a geographical area into a 
common space, giving form to the idea of ‘regionalism’, structural inhibitors to cooperation 
typically add further complicating factors (Hills, 2008). Hills (2008) argues that sub-state 
politics and issues tend to override concerns about regional security. She observes that: ‘sub-
state issues dominate government threat assessments … police rarely pay attention to 
developments outside their locality, and few exert cross-border influence’ (Hills, 2008:103). 
This suggests that deep-seated obstacles to regional cooperation need to be addressed if 
cooperative networks and measures are to be fully implemented in practice. 
 
Although the SADC appears, on face value, to be establishing an effective framework for 
cooperation, its capacity to facilitate cross-border police cooperation continues to be curtailed 
by budgetary constraints (Kanganja, 2016). SARPCCO continues to rely heavily upon 
Interpol and lacks a well-resourced headquarters and intelligence agency (Tait and van der 
Spuy, 2010; SADC 2018). Reliance upon the resources of Interpol continues to be critical. 
For example, Operation ‘Usalama III’ saw the deployment of 1,500 police from 22 countries 
in East and Southern Africa to conduct tens of thousands of checks relating to cross-border 
criminality using Interpol databases within a 48-hour period, resulting in a number of arrests 
(Interpol, 2016). In the aftermath of the operation, the Inspector General of the Kenyan 
National Police Service commented that ‘(o)perations like Usalama show what can be 
achieved when law enforcement agencies work closely together in combating transnational 
crime’ (ibid). Nevertheless, the absence of a well-funded, dedicated budget which could 
finance joint operations and maintain well-resourced units of analysts and liaison officers 
undermines the ability of the organization to reduce cross-border crime at its very roots. The 
secondment of police officers to neighbouring police forces or the payment of informants for 
information is too costly for some individual police forces, and SARPCCO cannot rely upon 
Interpol to fund such initiatives on a regular basis (Lucey, 2010). Interpol (2018) has recently 
invested two million Euro to enhance the inter-operability of the police communications 
infrastructure in Africa, which will go some way toward facilitating similar forms of 
information exchange and cooperation in the future, but it is little more than seed funding. 
Due in part to its lack of infrastructure and funding, SARPCCO appears to have evolved 
largely as a hub for multi-lateral training initiatives. Its Calendar of Activities for 2018, for 
example, reflects a large number of training courses which are being offered to participant 
police forces (SARPCCO, 2018). Courses have been designed to enhance both generic 
policing skills (crime intelligence, investigation, forensics and crime scene management) as 
well as investigative skills relating to transnational organized crime (drug trafficking, 
counter-terrorism, firearms, environmental crime, human trafficking, online child sexual 
exploitation and maritime piracy) (ibid). 
 
The limitations of SARPCCO mean that, in practice, a disproportionate amount of 
cooperation is centred around the national South African Police Service (SAPS), which is 
comparatively well-resourced (Tait and van der Spuy, 2010). SAPS helps to fill the void by 
acting as the driver of cross-border police operations to tackle organized crime, weapon 
trafficking, human trafficking, terrorism, illegal immigration and livestock theft in close 
cooperation with police forces in countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and 
Angola (van der Spuy, 2009; Edwards, 2010). It also conducts regular joint operations and 
border patrols with the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) to tackle dagga smuggling 
(a regional term for cannabis), drug dealing, diamond smuggling, armed robberies, illegal 
migration and the theft of vehicles and cattle. Weekly inter-agency meetings between SAPS 
and the LMPS teams have culminated in the development of monthly operational plans to 
carry out joint activities (Lucey, 2010). The degree of cooperation between South Africa and 
Lesotho was particularly remarkable since both countries had virtually closed their borders to 
one another between the 1970s and 1990s. South Africa had reportedly feared that Lesotho 
was working to undermine the system of apartheid by supporting the cause of the African 
National Congress (ANC) (Lucey, 2010). Similar forms of cooperation have evolved between 
SAPS and the Mozambique Republic Police (PRM), resulting information exchange and ‘hot 
pursuit’ arrangements between both jurisdictions (Monyane, 2010).  
 
In reality, SARPCCO appears to be quite far removed from a centralized (or centralizing) 
organization which can coordinate, support and finance operations and maintain a common 
intelligence database and communication system. The lack of a centralized organizational 
hierarchy which can identify the competencies, needs and skills gaps of the participant police 
forces means that internal power struggles between senior police officers and ambiguity 
around roles and responsibilities tend to hamper the most basic bilateral operations from the 
outset (van der Spuy, 2009; Monyane, 2010). Neighbouring police forces are typically 
sharing information and intelligence on a needs-basis and frequently rely upon informal 
phone conversations to discuss cases (Lucey, 2010). Even the employment of translators to 
overcome the difficulties of interpersonal communication between two police officers who do 
not speak the same language can be problematic (Monyane, 2010). Cooperation remains ad 
hoc, disjointed and inconsistent across the region (Tait and van der Spuy, 2010; Kanganja, 
2016).  
 
Moreover, no systematic frameworks or clear operating procedures have been put in place to 
standardize or formalize processes of hot pursuit or information exchange across the region. 
Participant States continue to rely upon protocols, agreements, Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOU) and letters of intent which do not have the same legal standing as conventions or 
treaties (van der Spuy, 2009). Some of the measures are little more than informal 
‘gentlemen’s agreements’. Moreover, no oversight mechanisms or systems of accountability 
have been established to scrutinize the quality of day-to-day police cooperation. Rather than 
respond to urgent operational needs, police forces can often do little other than participate in 
joint operations only when officers and resources became available (Lucey, 2010). As a 
result, regions in Southern Africa remain highly accessible, attractive and an area of low risk 
for organized crime (van der Spuy, 2009). 
 
Although the SADC spearheaded the introduction of a range of radical instruments in the 
early 2000s which were designed to establish the features of formalization, centralization, 
regulation and regularization which are central to various forms of effective cross-border 
cooperation, it has failed to realize many of the features in reality. Similarly, although 
SARPCCO has been central to the development of cross-border police cooperation in 
Southern Africa and, at least initially, enjoyed an unprecedented level of co-option or ‘buy in’ 
from participating police forces, its development appears to have been stymied. SARPCCO’s 
1997 Agreement and SADC’s 2001 Protocols called for the establishment of centralized 
information databases and working groups which could have grown and proliferated within a 
central organization such as SARPCCO. Instead there is little evidence to suggest that the 
SADC has overseen a radical improvement in the condition of cross-border police 
cooperation in Southern Africa. It has done little other than centralize the responsibility and 
authority for the transnational policing agenda within a transnational organization (itself) 
without strengthening or centralizing the structures and processes for cross-border police 
cooperation on the ground. If the SADC cannot bring more resources and organizational 
clarity to bear, its integration and centralization of the police cooperation agenda, and 
incorporation of SARPCCO, is little more than a superficial exercise.  
 
Unfortunately, the SADC’s attitude towards police cooperation appears to be well reflected in 
its own recent review of the progress it has made towards the creation of a National Firearms 
Electronic Database. Rather than supporting and funding the involvement and capacity of 
participant police forces, it reiterated the need for police agencies to mobilize resources from 
development partners so that they could participate fully in the initiative (SADC, 2017a). 
Donor-assistance and funding are considered to be crucial to successful cross-border 
operations in Southern Africa despite their provisional and unpredictable nature. Lauded 
operations such as the policing of the FIFA World Cup ‘mega event’ in South Africa in 2010 
were successful largely because of generous budgets provided by FIFA and other 
international donors, which facilitated the purchase of state-of-the-art technology and the 
maintenance of joint policing databases and networks in the short-term (van der Spuy, 2010). 
Similarly, regional initiatives such as ‘Operation Rachel’ which focused on the destruction of 
firearms and arms caches in Southern Africa, depended heavily upon donor funding from the 
UK, the EU and regional and international NGOs (Monyane, 2010). 
 
The evolution of the Southern African framework for transnational policing: the challenges of 
further centralization 
The inability of the SADC to fulfil its potential and its relative lack of progress over the past 
decade means that it is difficult to predict the future trajectory of transnational policing in 
Southern Africa. The recent establishment of Afripol could be viewed as a renewed attempt 
at centralization. Interpol, which supported the establishment of the new institution, values 
regionalism (its member states are divided into geopolitical regions and it delivers its key 
services on a regional basis in recognition of regional needs), so it is likely that it will support 
the development of a strong and influential regional organization. The EU and SADC 
officials have also held workshops to establish new frameworks for partnership and 
cooperation, and Europol has pledged to help Afripol build its structures (Tumwebaze, 2014; 
SADC, 2016), potentially in its own image (Vorrath and Zoppei, 2017). The EU has even 
provided funding for a three-year project (2017 – 2019) called ENACT (enhancing Africa’s 
capacity to respond to transnational organized crime) which is tasked with raising awareness 
about the corrosive effects of transnational organized crime on the continent and to enable 
African countries to respond more effectively to transnational organized crime. However, 
Hills (2008) observes that meaningful regional organizations involving African states are 
more likely to develop in response to governments confronting similar or shared domestic 
problems and challenges than to external prompts or to any simple desire for integration 
(Hills, 2008). The history of serious disorder and inter-state conflict in the region has not only 
created weak political, social, economic and legal structures but rendered governments and 
civil society particularly distrustful of external attempts at intervention and advice (Dissel, 
2010; Nathan, 2013). 
 
The legacy of external peacekeeping and intervention missions 
Throughout the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, peacekeeping and capacity-
building missions have had a significant effect on the shape and nature of transnational 
policing across the African continent. Long-term policing assistance and reform missions 
became the standard modus operandi for peacekeeping initiatives from the 1990s onwards 
due to the belief that modern police forces, which were designed to protect civilians and 
establish an ethos of community-oriented policing and human rights compliance, were more 
likely to engender feelings of safety, fairness and justice, than soldiers who were trained to 
rely upon the threat of violence to suppress or deter opponents (see Blum and Pearson 
chapters above). A functioning police force was also considered to be a crucial prerequisite 
for the establishment and viability of new political and electoral structures, election 
monitoring processes, human rights protections, the functioning of the courts system, 
disarmament and economic investment (Kukkuk, 2010). Seconded police officers and 
advisors from the EU, and further afield, were increasingly relied upon to assist, support, 
mentor, train, monitor and reconstruct police forces and, in some cases, carry out executive 
policing functions to restore law and order. 
 
However, it quickly became evident that peacekeeping missions and capacity-building 
programmes did not always engender stronger bonds between police forces and the 
communities they served, nor did they create better transnational relationships between donor 
and receiving States. UN missions, sometimes containing ‘brigades’ of hundreds of police 
officers and civilian police, were frequently associated with the excessive use of force, abuse 
of power, sexual assault, gender-based violence and torture, amongst other ills (van der Spuy, 
2009). Some UN police officers were suspected of running organized smuggling rings, 
participating in organized paedophilia networks, engaging in widespread sexual violence, 
swapping weapons with rebel groups for gold, tipping off arms traffickers prior to raids, and 
the exchange of food for sex, amongst a litany of other offences (Monyane, 2010; UN 2013, 
2016, 2018). Contingents from other African States attached to UN missions were equally 
associated with serious misconduct. Poorly resourced and managed peacekeepers could be 
corrupted quite easily in instances where crime, insurgency, or private employment promised 
greater economic benefits than government employment (Kukkuk, 2010). Moreover, rather 
than (re)introducing much needed community-oriented policing styles, UN and AU peace 
operations became renowned for using militarized Peacekeeping Standby Forces (PSFs) and 
Formed Police Units (FPUs) to respond overzealously to large-scale crowd control and public 
disorder in an attempt to present an image of stability and peace to the international 
community (Kukkuk, 2010). Such repressive tactics were closely associated with previous 
abusive regimes and suggested that the close alignment between the public police and those 
in power had not been disturbed. Local populations who were previously conditioned to 
believe that the excessive use of force was a normal type of social interaction, continued to 
experience the same forms of repressive policing to which they had become accustomed 
(Goldsmith and Harris, 2017). 
 
Not only were foreign peace-keepers guilty of serious misconduct, but the UN has come 
under severe criticism for its own approach to police accountability. Although UN police 
missions were generally endowed with internal professional standards departments and a 
prescriptive set of disciplinary infractions, the Commissioner of Police of a UN mission could 
only hand down administrative penalties to an offender, such as a fine, dismissal from UN 
duty, repatriation, or blacklisting from future missions. He or she could also recommend that 
the contributing police force take action against errant officers. However, the UN left it 
largely up to the contributing police force to decide whether and to what extent an officer 
should be punished for extraterritorial misconduct (UN 2013; 2016; 2018). The reality on the 
ground in many African countries is that there was a clear lack of dedicated staff or structures 
within police institutions to intervene in the deployment of officers on foreign missions or 
even to review their performance upon their return (Goldsmith and Harris, 2017). Even if the 
UN Secretary-General waived an errant officer’s immunity, the country in which the 
misconduct occurred rarely has an effective, robust or operational criminal justice system 
which could hold the officer to account. The net result is that the UN failed, in many cases, to 
take the necessary steps to protect vulnerable populations from violence by peace-keepers or 
deliver accountability, allowing a sense of impunity to prevail. Furthermore, reports about 
limited pre-deployment training and surveys which indicate that handbooks, such as the UN 
Criminal Justice Standards for Peacekeeping Police and the Brahimi Report, go largely 
unread by a significant proportion of police practitioners, have contributed to an image of UN 
police advisors as individuals who are less knowledgeable than the local police officers they 
are advising (Kukkuk, 2010; Goldsmith and Harris, 2017). 
 
The legacy of UN structures and processes for police governance and accountability means 
that many African countries are cynical about ‘Western’ policing standards and distrust post-
colonial styles of police assistance and reform (van der Spuy, 2009; Goldsmith and Harris, 
2017). Kukkuk (2010) reported that, such was the level of cynicism, the need for different 
mechanisms of police accountability was not even readily considered or discussed in the 
numerous meetings that led to the design and formation of the SADC and African Union 
(AU) standby forces for police missions. This is not to say that police forces in Southern 
Africa remain untainted by scandal either. SARPCCO developed a Code of Conduct in 2001 
in an effort to establish minimum professional standards for its participant police forces and 
services, but it lacked clear indicators for monitoring or measuring adherence to the standards 
of behaviour and was largely devoid of mechanisms of enforcement to ensure compliance 
(Lucey, 2010). Despite receiving assistance from the African Policing Civilian Oversight 
Forum (APCOF) to develop monitoring indicators and assessment tools to examine the levels 
of compliance with the Code, major differences in political and cultural approaches to police 
accountability resulted in frequent and flagrant violations of the code (Dissel and Frank, 
2012). Even the South African Police Service, which is probably the most robust, well-
resourced, technologically-advanced and experienced of the Southern African police forces, 
has been scarred by allegations of misconduct and corruption (Corruption Watch, 2017). 
South Africa’s position as the economic powerhouse of the region and its administrative 
capacity makes it attractive to donors who are willing to finance cross-border training 
initiatives in areas of strategic management, criminal investigation, community policing, 
human rights, police ethics and police governance, but it too has been portrayed as an ‘agent 
of imposition’ and criticized for its ‘ill-defined interventions’ in other ill-understood African 
cultures (van der Spuy, 2009, 256).  
 
Lessons from the EU’s transnational policing project 
If current and future leaders of Southern African countries can manage to overcome the 
financial and societal challenges to cooperation, the EU-type measures which the SADC has 
already put in place could serve as a launchpad to realize the EU model more fully. Many of 
the legal frameworks are already in place for SARPCCO to evolve into an organization much 
like Europol, with similar tools at its disposal. However, any attempt by SARPCCO or 
Afripol to establish an organization like Europol to combat transnational organized crime and 
terrorism at a regional level should attach significant weight to what has worked, avoid what 
has not worked and incorporate any missed opportunities. 
 
As the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was being established in 1992, 
with responsibility for fostering greater regional police cooperation, the EU was also being 
formed, with a ‘common interest’ in police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and 
combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other forms of international crime (Art. 
K1(9) Title VI Maastricht Treaty 1992), alongside a multitude of other policy areas. EU 
Member States were expected to pursue new initiatives to facilitate police cooperation, in 
connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within 
a European Police Office (Europol) (Art. K1). Like the SADC, there were a number of 
factors which culminated in the establishment of the new EU competency. The end of the 
Cold War generated a wave of political goodwill and interest in inter-governmental 
cooperation in areas, such as police cooperation, which had been the subject of little political 
interest and activity in previous decades. The Council of Europe (CoE) had developed 
numerous instruments for mutual legal assistance and extradition in the aftermath of the 
Second World War to harmonize and simplify cooperation between jurisdictions, but few 
countries had moved to ratify them in their entirety (Benyon et al., 1993; Anderson et al., 
1995). The same was largely true of UN efforts to harmonize specific criminal offence 
definitions, particularly in the areas of illicit drug production, human trafficking and terrorism 
across Europe. Where government officials had tried to establish policy-driven networks, 
such as Trevi (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale), they were 
largely eschewed by police practitioners for being overly bureaucratic and out of touch with 
practical needs (Fijnaut, 1993; Anderson and Den Boer, 1994; Hebenton and Thomas, 1995). 
Although headquartered in France, Interpol functions primarily as a global communications 
agency which facilitates the sending of correspondence and information through its liaison 
bureaux and communication centres and undertakes some limited thematic analyses at its 
headquarters (Anderson, 1989; Bresler, 1992). It is not expected to manage systematic police 
cooperation on the ground or establish legal frameworks for joint operations. 
 
More importantly, the EU Member States were initially concerned about removing the 
internal border controls between the Member States to facilitate the free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital. It was argued at the time that an open and single market could 
lead to the creation of five million new jobs, re-direct billions of pounds which was being 
spent on the maintenance of border crossings and related technical functions, and enable the 
Member States to compete and negotiate with American and Japanese conglomerates as a 
single and powerful economic bloc (European Commission, 1989). The Member States of 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, known as the Benelux States, had long enjoyed 
economic benefits from the abolition of their internal border controls and played a large part 
in convincing the other EU Member States of the financial and political merits of doing the 
same (Occhipinti, 2003). However, police chiefs, politicians, academics and other members 
of civil society were concerned that, upon the wider removal of border controls, the highly 
lucrative markets of the Member States would incur an influx of transient criminals, illegal 
immigrants and stolen and counterfeit goods which would otherwise have been stymied by 
the traditional border checks (Anderson et al., 1995). These concerns were further amplified 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, with fears that it could potentially open the 
floodgates to increased illegal immigration, the unchecked entry of convicted criminals, and 
the entry of former Soviet-based organized crime networks (Van Dijk and Spapens, 2014). 
Although largely illusory, the uneasy political and public discourse about the arrival of 
foreign organized crime and immigration in the absence of border checks, coupled with the 
traditional limits of jurisdiction which tied police powers to national territories, created fears 
about an ‘internal security deficit’ which needed to be addressed (Benyon et al., 1993; 
Anderson et al., 1995; Den Boer, 2002).  
 
Academics such as Benyon et al. (1993) pointed out that the removal of internal border 
checkpoints would make little difference to international immigration, drug trafficking and 
terrorism since borders were always highly porous. Only a small proportion of travellers were 
typically stopped and checked at border crossings on mainland Europe, and most were simply 
waved through (Ressler, 1992). Many European countries typically had so many points of 
entry by road, river, field or sea that border checks could be circumnavigated with relative 
ease (Nadelmann, 1993). For those who passed through border checks, the forgery of identity 
papers and transport documents was commonplace (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). Even a cursory 
acknowledgement of the drugs being trafficked into European countries and the number of 
terrorist attacks carried out on mainland Europe and the British Isles in the 1970s and ‘80s 
indicated that border checkpoints served as little more than a customs and excise function 
(Anderson, 1989). Nevertheless, numerous high-profile politicians were guilty of closely 
associating long-standing problems of organized crime and terrorism with largely 
unconnected issues of migration, cheap labour, unemployment, social dislocation and rising 
crime to generate an unfounded ‘globalised crime anxiety’ to support the introduction of new 
EU measures and populist policies (Bigot, 1994; Loader and Sparks, 2002). The ideas of 
‘internal security’ and ‘globalization’ were, to some extent, being used as rhetorical levers to 
create a perpetual sense of crisis to legitimate the introduction of new populist ‘law and 
order’ political initiatives at the heart of the EU project (Zener, 2009; Ellison and Pine, 2012).  
 
The evolution of Europol: A cautionary tale 
Although Europol is now considered to be the centrepiece of the EU’s regime for cross-
border police cooperation, and has pledged to help Afripol build up its organizational 
structures and processes, the ambitious concept had never been piloted or tested before the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 (Hebenton and Thomas, 1995). Although it was 
incorporated as a treaty objective, the heads of state and government had only previously 
spoken about the idea of Europol in conceptual terms. No substantive attempt had been made 
to prove that the EU framework was the most suitable environment within which to build the 
new trans-European policing initiatives, nor was any attempt made to clarify whether and to 
what extent the EU measures would coexist with the existing international organizations 
already active in the crowded policy space, not least the CoE, the UN and Interpol (Anderson 
et al., 1995; Walker, 2000). A similar degree of uncertainty and speculation has arguably 
continued to define and shape the EU policing project ever since. The EU has acted, at times, 
without convincing evidence that their transnational policing initiatives were worth it or even 
necessary. As a result, a number of EU measures have faced a number of political, procedural 
and existential challenges, some of which have not yet been reconciled. 
 
One pervasive issue is the fact that, despite the introduction of numerous safeguards within 
Europol’s infrastructure, police forces remain reluctant to share information and cautious 
when doing so because the unintentional dissemination of shared information, the 
misappropriation of sensitive intelligence by corrupt officers or officials, and system hacks 
can jeopardize investigations, informers, undercover officers and policing techniques 
(Strobeck, 1997; Fijnaut, 2002; Block, 2017). As a result, EU representatives and bureaucrats 
began to develop and promote new ways of encouraging police forces to cooperate. The EU 
Framework Decision on ‘simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between 
law enforcement authorities of the Member States’, better known as the ‘Swedish Framework 
Decision’ (2006/960/JHA), for example, required police forces to respond to requests for 
information from foreign police forces or EU agencies such as Europol in the same manner 
and with the same expediency as they would for requests between local police units, under 
conditions not stricter than those applicable at local levels. The ‘principle of availability’ was 
thereafter incorporated into numerous procedural instruments, not least the European 
Investigation Order (EIO) (Directive 2014/41/EU).  
 
The shift in ethos from simply facilitating and enabling cooperation through European 
mechanisms to forcing police officers to cooperate with foreign counterparts garnered many 
critics and, while it may have generated more cooperation, it has arguably done little to foster 
greater trust between police practitioners (Ouwerkerk, 2015; Hufnagel and McCartney, 
2017). In many cases, the legal and constitutional standards, processes and conditions in 
foreign jurisdictions are not the equivalent of standards, processes and safeguards shared by 
local police units within a single jurisdiction. Research indicates that, by requiring police 
forces to upload intelligence to the EIS and share information through Europol, even where 
they are unwilling to do so, the EU has served to undermine the relationship between 
participants and the broader EU policing project (Hillebrand, 2011; Sheptycki, 2017). 
 
Another persistent issue is the tendency of the EU to introduce policing measures without 
conducting robust feasibility studies or practitioner consultation. For example, as Europol 
was being developed in 1995, a preliminary Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) was established to set 
the groundwork for the organization (EU Joint Action 95/73/JHA). Since the Europol 
Convention had not yet been introduced, the EDU was prohibited from storing any 
information sent to it as it did not have adequate or robust data safeguards to protect the 
secrecy and integrity of the files (Strobeck, 1997). This prevented the EDU from supporting 
joint operations in any real, meaningful way, other than bringing together liaison officers to 
share files amongst themselves (Occhipinti, 2003). Nevertheless, the government ministers 
and representatives on the Council of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA Council) introduced 
Joint Actions in 1996 and 1997 to increase the mandate of the EDU to include not only 
serious drug crime but offences of human trafficking, vehicle trafficking and the smuggling 
of nuclear materials. A Europol IT system and database had not even been established or 
populated with information about drug offences and criminal networks when the EDU’s 
liaison officers were expected to turn their attention to an array of additional crime areas. 
This indicated that the government ministers and EU officials were determined to realize an 
ambitious and illusory vision of transnational policing without fully appreciating the needs 
and capabilities of the practitioners involved. 
 
This tendency has also resulted in a significant degree of policy over-reach. For example, 
while the EU’s Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 2000 (not too 
dissimilar to the SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 2002) was 
being ratified the EU took the remarkable decision to bypass the national parliaments’ 
ongoing deliberations by introducing arguably the most contentious aspect of the convention 
by other means. The Convention promised to reduce the bureaucracy of sending letters of 
request between government ministries (see Cox chapter above) by incorporating the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’, which had long been used in the EU’s economic 
community policy area. The principle revolved around the premise that judiciaries would be 
required to officially recognize the courts of neighbouring jurisdictions as authoritative 
equals to the greatest extent possible without seeking further validation or legal clarity 
(Walsh, 2009a; Ouwerkerk, 2015). It rested primarily on the assumption that each Member 
State guaranteed minimum procedural human rights standards across their investigative, 
prosecution and detention processes in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), so judges and magistrates should simply assume that the 
minimum standards required to issue a legal warrant had been met. Not surprisingly, the 
proposal was subject to sustained criticism since jurisdictions such as France, Spain and the 
UK were historically reluctant to engage in systematic judicial cooperation with each other 
due to significant differences in criminal laws, policing processes and long-standing political 
tensions (although see Cox chapter above for examples of informal forms of cooperation 
which proved effective). Their criminal justice systems were not as closely aligned as those 
in the Benelux, Nordic and federal German systems, which had been harmonizing or ‘tuning’ 
their basic criminal laws, investigative procedures and professional practice for the purposes 
of cross-border police and prosecutorial cooperation since the mid-twentieth century (Rijken, 
2003; Den Boer, 2010; Spapens, 2011).  
 
The EU could do this because the Amsterdam Treaty 1997, which amended the Maastricht 
Treaty, had empowered the justice ministers to independently introduce new legally-binding 
procedural frameworks, known as Decisions and Framework Decisions, instead of having to 
secure the approval of each national parliament, as was required under the previous 
convention instrument (Arts. 34 and 35). Framework Decisions, in particular, could be used 
by the Council to introduce legally binding minimum rules concerning the approximation of 
laws and regulations within the Member States, who were obliged to give them the closest 
‘useful effect’ possible to enable consistent interpretation (Pupino, Case C-105/03 ECR). The 
Member States had bestowed the Council with this independent legislative responsibility in 
matters of internal security primarily out of fear that the accession of ten new Member States 
to the EU in 2004 would render unworkable the traditional process of moving conventions 
through each and every national parliament (De Moor and Vermeulen, 2010). It had 
previously taken more than three years to ratify the Europol Convention using the Maastricht-
era provisions and a further two years on average to ratify each subsequent protocol to the 
Convention (Walker, 2011). It was envisaged that the new instruments would enable the JHA 
Council to enhance and amend the existing structures, processes and objectives of cross-
border policing with significant flexibility and expediency in response to changing 
circumstances and emerging political priorities, even if it meant riding roughshod over 
democratic and judicial controls (Den Boer, 2002; Peers, 2011).  
 
Academic commentators, at the time, argued that the lethargic approaches of the national 
parliaments could have simply been remedied with a more straight-forward treaty provision 
which limited their deliberations to a short time period, possibly no more than six months, 
and that such a period of negotiation was normal and, most importantly, necessary in order to 
formulate a single substantive instrument which could overcome significant political and 
legal differences between jurisdictions while still respecting key constitutional, legal and 
administrative values and practices (Anderson et al., 1995; Peers, 2011).  
 
More particularly, the JHA Council used the new instruments to introduce the principle of 
mutual recognition in two key areas: joint investigations and extradition. In the aftermath of 
the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA and faced with the accession of ten new 
Member States, the Council introduced a Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams 
(JITs) 2002 and the Framework Decision on the EAW 2002, which copied the relevant 
mutual recognition provisions from the Convention almost verbatim. JITs were designed to 
fast-track and simplify the establishment of joint investigation teams using a single letter of 
request and were modelled on processes used in federal Germany across the separate Lander 
(Block, 2011, 2012). No appropriate feasibility studies had been conducted prior to their 
introduction and almost no effort had been made to accommodate the conventional legal rules 
and values of the constituent police forces across the EU area (ibid). As a result, countries 
such as England, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands largely eschewed EU JITs in practice 
and introduced their own domestic legal instruments to create more flexible, dynamic, 
responsive, and simpler investigation teams, unique to their particular border regions 
(Spapens, 2011; Walsh, 2011). The Irish Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, for 
example, enabled foreign police officers to participate in controlled deliveries with the same 
immunities and liabilities as outlined in the Framework Decision, but without requiring a 
formal JIT to be established. 
 
The EAW, on the other hand, facilitated the extradition or surrender of individuals on the 
basis of mutual recognition, with only limited grounds for refusal. Far more popular than the 
JIT instrument, between 2005 and 2010 more than 68,000 EAWs were issued, but 
unfortunately (and controversially) they were used on occasion to surrender individuals for 
minor offences which would not previously have qualified for extradition in many 
jurisdictions, such as the theft of ten chickens, a piglet or a bottle of beer, and also for 
contentious political activities (Haggen Müller, 2013; Boycott, 2017). The application of 
mutual recognition meant that judges of a common law, adversarial tradition, who typically 
questioned applicant police officers and prosecutors in court to scrutinize the integrity of 
warrant applications, were required to take foreign applications for warrants at face value, 
without further scrutiny (Walsh, 2009b). By eroding these long-standing judicial safeguards, 
the instrument was criticized for being weighted in favour of catching suspects and repressive 
crime control rather than adequately protecting the due process and human rights protections 
of the alleged criminals (Ouwerkerk, 2015; Wade 2015). Furthermore, in terms of 
transparency and accountability, details about the number and nature of cases which involved 
minor crimes, the fairness of the process, the protection of human rights, the punishment of 
political opinion and the sentences handed down were almost impossible to quantify or 
determine (Ouwerkerk, 2015). Not all court decisions were habitually recorded and published 
in each jurisdiction (or at an EU level) and, most importantly, defence lawyers did not always 
try to challenge applications for EAWs or object to them pursuant to human rights legislation 
(Haggen Müller, 2013). Rather than heralding a new ethos of transparency and cooperation, 
attempts by judges to challenge the integrity of an EAW application and, by extension, the 
procedural integrity of a foreign court were even met with open hostility from foreign 
governments and media outlets on occasion (Keene, 2018).  
 
Quite remarkably, the two measures were followed by even more problematic instruments of 
mutual recognition. Between 2003 and 2005, for instance, two Framework Decisions 
pertaining to the seizure of evidence across borders were introduced and before the latter one 
was even implemented, the EU moved to replace it with an even more expansive European 
Investigation Order (EIO). The EIO was designed to function as a standard warrant that could 
be used to not only request evidence already in the possession of the State but to request a 
wide array of investigative measures to be carried out using a standard application form. The 
haste with which all of these instruments were introduced gave succour to the argument that a 
political majority within the EU clearly preferred the introduction of more repressive, 
prosecution-focused, punitive and expedient measures over and above the judicial protection 
of the individual (Ouwerkerk, 2015). Within a remarkably short space of time the EU’s 
policy area of ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) had become the busiest and most 
disjointed policy area at the transnational level (Monar, 2002; Walker, 2011). Murphy (2011) 
observed that one of the most ironic developments was that the instruments were not 
introduced by the EU because of a high degree of trust between the Member State 
parliaments, police forces and judiciaries but, more particularly, because of a continued and 
distinct lack of trust and agreement between them. Walker (2000) argued that another irony 
was that the Member States would never have allowed such contempt of constitutional and 
democratic norms within their own national legislative systems. 
 
Fortunately, the EU Council and Parliament have since sought to rebalance the EU’s 
predominant ‘crime control’ model towards a more rights-oriented ‘due process’ model 
(Packer 1964). The greater involvement of the EU Parliament pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty, 
and the introduction of the ‘co-decision’ and ‘emergency brake’ procedures have helped to 
create a far more considered and democratic, albeit slower, policy process and have kept the 
tendency of EU ministers to introduce emotionally-charged partisan legislation and abusive 
practices in check (Loader and Walker, 2007; Fletcher, 2011). Most importantly, in an effort 
to promote and foster greater ‘mutual trust’ between participating states, a number of key 
directives have been introduced to protect the rights of suspects and victims of crime pursuant 
to Article 82 TFEU (Hufnagel and McCartney, 2017). Directive 2012/29/EU, for instance, 
established minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, 
covering legal advice, interpretation and translation, protection measures, specialized support, 
and accommodation, amongst other measures. Directive 2013/48/EU, on the other hand, was 
introduced to expand and protect the right of suspects, including the right to have a lawyer 
present during police interrogations, external communication and translation services, 
amongst other provisions. More recently, Directive 2016/343/EU on the strengthening of 
certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in 
criminal proceedings has helped to further enhance common minimum standards.  
 
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the EAW was in place for more than a decade before these 
basic and necessary procedural rights were introduced at the transnational level. The 
differences and clear gaps between national criminal justice systems and between national 
and transnational proceedings, which could strip individuals of their constitutional identities 
and protective rights, were plainly evident at the start of the EAW project and were the 
primary cause of the initial political hesitancy to introduce such measures through previous 
institutions, such as the CoE, in the first place (Walsh 2002, 2016; Wade 2015). The 
experience has served as a lesson to the EU, and to communities such as the SADC who may 
seek to mimic it, that justice ministers, EU officials, ambassadors, ‘interest shapers’ and 
technocrats on working groups and committees can have a propensity for valuing procedural 
expediency and the appearance of political productivity over and above legal tradition and the 
needs, expectations and preparedness of practitioners. The ‘security’ discourse which shaped 
the creation of the EU policing project evidently gave rise to insular policy-making forums at 
the EU level which had a vested interest in stimulating anxieties and the continuous 
expansion of European policy in the policing field, whether or not it was necessary or even 
desirable, partly because political expectation demanded it and the jobs of technocrats 
depended upon it (Walker, 2006; Zener, 2009).  
 
The fact that poorly conceived, contentious and often unworkable measures were introduced 
by largely self-serving EU bodies which were considerably undemocratic continues to afflict 
the EU and its legacy (Mitsilegas, 2008; Spapens, 2017). Euro-scepticism is growing within 
the EU area and the problematic measures have not yet been completely reformed or re-
balanced. Neither the JIT nor EAW instruments have been transformed into ‘Directives’, 
even though the Lisbon Treaty requires it; arguably because the national and EU parliaments 
are likely to use any opportunity of renegotiation to demand drastic reform of the EU policing 
infrastructure (Baker, 2015). The fact that much needed reform has not yet taken place should 
serve as a warning to other inter-governmental organizations. As the SADC continues to 
develop its policing and mutual assistance measures, it should tread carefully when 
considering comparable EU instruments as a benchmark. 
 
Conclusion 
The long-standing under-development of public police agencies and institutional weaknesses, 
which have led to a degree of strategic and institutional fluidity, continue to shape the 
prospects for cross-border police cooperation in Southern Africa. As a result, new approaches 
to government and donor funding are needed, and the legacy of ill-defined foreign 
interventions must not be ignored. Deliberations aimed at building consensus around 
principles and operational strategies, for instance in the policing of assemblies and public 
health, should feature increasingly in regional conversations (Biegon et al., 2017; SADC, 
2017b). If Southern African governments and police forces can work together to pursue 
transnational policing initiatives as zealously as their European counterparts, albeit in a more 
democratic, community-oriented, practitioner-focused and measured manner, the condition of 
transnational policing in Southern Africa could be greatly improved. To start, it is submitted 
that Southern Africa needs to develop an innovative and flexible framework of police 
cooperation which is clearly enunciated in a way that permeates government policy, 
legislative initiatives, judicial decisions, policing ethos and the ‘institutionalization’ and 
‘operationalization’ of police cooperation in practice. 
 
The evolution of transnational policing in Southern Africa has many similarities to the early 
years of the EU regime for cross-border police cooperation, but Southern Africa should try to 
learn from the failures and lessons of the tainted EU project to reshape and redefine the 
institutional development of its national and transnational policing infrastructure. The modern 
EU regime hides a deeply fractured relationship between Member State police forces and the 
transnational policing infrastructure, which continues to affect the degree of co-option across 
Europe. SARPCCO and the SADC must ensure that the actual threat of cross-border crime 
and the problems of cooperation are defined and measured so that initiatives and measures 
are driven by informed calculation and practitioner consultation rather than abstract rhetoric 
and superficial political ambition. Decisions should be taken as closely as possible to police 
practitioners and civil society; and open and transparent mechanisms of communication and 
complaint must be maintained. Reforms should be evidence-based, progressive and holistic 
so that a more knowledgeable and critical audience is not continually asking the police to 
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